25-ORD-397 – Daniel Woodie/Bellevue Police Department

Opinion Content:

December 10, 2025

In re: Daniel Woodie/Bellevue Police Department

Summary: The Bellevue Police Department (“the Department”) did not
violate the Open Records Act (“the Act”) when it denied the Appellant’s
request on the basis of residency.

Open Records Decision

On October 30, 2025, Daniel Woodie (“Appellant”) submitted a request to the
Department seeking the personnel file of a former officer, all records related to a
specific individual’s participation in a certain program, and records of “any criminal
activity” related to two specific individuals and one address. The Appellant stated
that he is a resident of the Commonwealth as defined in KRS 61.870(10)(d) and
further explained that he has a workplace in Kentucky. In response, the Department
denied the Appellant’s request, stating he does meet the Act’s residency
requirements. On November 7, 2025, the Appellant appealed.

On December 1, 2025, the Appellant submitted a request to the Department
seeking another officer’s personnel file, records documenting all records requests the
Department has received since 2023 and its responses to those requests, records
documenting any training the agency had undergone related to the Act,
communications related to the Appellant’s October 30 request, and communications
between the Department and three named individuals and a different county agency.
The Department also denied this request on the basis of residency. On December 2,
2025, the Appellant appealed this denial. 1

1 Because both appeals arose out of denials based on the Appellant’s residency status, the Office has
consolidated these two appeals. See, e.g., 22-ORD-167.

Under the Act, “[a]ll public records shall be open for inspection by any resident
of the Commonwealth,” and “[a]ny resident of the Commonwealth shall have the right
to inspect public records.” KRS 61.872 (emphasis added). Because only a “resident of
the Commonwealth” has the “right to inspect public records,” KRS 61.872(2)(a), a
nonresident has no statutory right of inspection.

In 25-ORD-156, the Office found that the Appellant is not a resident of the
Commonwealth under either KRS 61.870(10)(a) or (d). KRS 61.870(10)(a) includes as
a resident of the Commonwealth “[a]n individual residing in the Commonwealth.”
KRS 61.8710(10)(d) includes as a resident of the Commonwealth “[a]n individual that
is employed and works at a location or locations within the Commonwealth.” In 25-
ORD-156, the agency had directed the Office’s attention to the Appellant’s sworn
testimony in which he stated he “work[s] from home” at a location outside Kentucky.
Based on that sworn testimony, the Office held that the Appellant was not a resident
of the Commonwealth, as defined under either KRS 61.870(10)(a) or (d). The
Appellant did not appeal the Office’s decision in 25-ORD-156. 2

In the present appeal, the Office invited both parties to explain why the Office
should or should not adhere to its precedent. 3 The Department stated that the
Appellant does not live or work in Kentucky. The Appellant argues that 25-ORD-156
was incorrectly decided and provides letters from his employer regarding his work
location. One letter referred to the Appellant as “a permanent teleworker living in” a
location not in Kentucky. The other letter stated that “his work is primarily remote”
but “he reports to” a worksite located in Kentucky on an “as needed” basis.

In 25-ORD-156, the Office explained that doing work on an “as needed” basis is
not sufficient to qualify as a resident of the Commonwealth under KRS 61.870(10)(d).
This is because doing work on an “as needed” basis leaves open the possibility that
the work in Kentucky might not ever again be “needed.” This type of statement states
only a belief that his work will occur at a location in Kentucky “at some anticipated
or hypothetical time in the future” and fails to demonstrate how the requester fits the
definition of resident of the Commonwealth at the time his request is made.

2 Under KRS 61.880(5)(a), the parties to an appeal may appeal the Office’s decisions within 30 days
of its issuance. A decision that is not appealed in that time “shall have the force and effect of law.”
KRS 61.880(5)(b). Although, the Appellant has explained why he chose not to appeal 25-ORD-156, that
decision remains final with “the force and effect of law.”
3 As previously explained, 25-ORD-156 is final. The Office’s inquiry sought to determine whether
the circumstances described in 25-ORD-156 remain unchanged.

Elsewhere, the Appellant refers to a Kentucky post office box he uses as
evidence that he resides in Kentucky, and therefore, qualifies as a resident under
KRS 61.870(10)(a). This does not rebut the sworn testimony the Office considered in
25-ORD-156, in which the Appellant himself identified his “work from home” location
as a residence not in Kentucky. Use of a post office box does not mean that an
individual resides in the Commonwealth. 4

As such, nothing in the record before the Office compels it to ignore its previous
holding in 25-ORD-156. Thus, the Appellant is not a resident of the Commonwealth.
Therefore, the Appellant has no statutory right of inspection, and thus, the
Department’s response could not violate the Act.

A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating an action in the
appropriate circuit court under KRS 61.880(5) and KRS 61.882 within 30 days from
the date of this decision. Under KRS 61.880(3), the Attorney General shall be notified
of any action in circuit court, but shall not be named as a party in that action or in
any subsequent proceedings. The Attorney General will accept notice of the complaint
emailed to [email protected].

Russell Coleman
Attorney General

/s/ Zachary M. Zimmerer
Zachary M. Zimmerer
Assistant Attorney General

#650 & 695

Dan Woodie
Jonathan McClain
Lindy Jenkins

4 In 22-ORD-120, the Office found that an agency violated the Act when it demanded proof of a
requester’s residency status. The requester had stated that he works at a location within the
Commonwealth and provided a post office box address in response to the agency’s demand for proof.
The Office held that the requester had provided the required statements of residence and the agency’s
demand for proof violated the Act. The Office did not find that the use of a post office box alone
establishes that a requester is a resident of the Commonwealth.