26-ORD-021 – Mohamed Aly/Kentucky Real Estate Authority

Opinion Content:

January 21, 2026

In re: Mohamed Aly/Kentucky Real Estate Authority

Summary: The Office cannot find that the Kentucky Real Estate
Authority (“the Authority”) violated the Open Records Act (“the Act”)
because the Office cannot resolve the factual dispute between the parties
regarding the records provided. The Office cannot find that the
Authority violated the Act when it affirmatively stated it provided all
responsive records in its possession.

Open Records Decision

Mohamed Aly (“Appellant”) submitted a request to the Authority containing
five parts, seeking records regarding the Authority’s complaint procedure. 1 The
Authority granted the Appellant’s request and provided responsive records. The
Authority also noted, “To the extent this request seeks for the Authority to support,
explain, or justify certain processes or policies, please be advised this request is
denied, as your request is for information, rather than a request for specifically
described records.” The Appellant initiated this appeal on three grounds: (1) the
records produced by the Authority differ from the records he requested; (2) The

1 The Appellant requested: (1) “all records supporting, justifying, or explaining the [Authority’s]
published policy that only complaints against licensed real estate agents or brokers are accepted.” (2)
“Please provide all records that support, justify, or explain [the Authority’s] published policy that
complaints may only be filed against licensees, including any relevant legal opinions, internal
procedures, forms, staff instructions, or other directives.” (3) “[A]ny forms, templates, or instructions
used to report or process allegations of unlicensed real estate practice, as well as any records
identifying the legal authority [the Authority] relies upon for declining, rejecting, or refusing to
investigate such complaints when the respondent is unlicensed.” (4) “[A]ny procedures or policies for
handling cases where an unlicensed individual acts under the supervision of a licensed broker.” (5)
“[A]ny policy or instruction regarding the processing of unlicensed-practice reports not submitted on
Form 300.”

Authority “denied the core request by mislabeling it as ‘information’”; (3) The
Authority’s “[f]ailure to Affirmatively State Nonexistence” of records.2

First, the Appellant claims the records he received differ from those he
requested. Conversely, the Authority asserts the records it produced were “all
responsive records.” The Office has previously found that it cannot resolve a factual
dispute between the parties to an appeal. See, e.g., 22-ORD-010 (declining to resolve
a factual dispute that the records received were different from the records requested).
Thus, a factual dispute exists between the Appellant and the Authority as to whether
the records the Appellant received are responsive to his request. In the end, the Office
cannot resolve the factual dispute, and thus, cannot find that the Authority violated
the Act.

Second, the Appellant asserted the Authority “denied the core request by
mislabeling it as ‘information.’” When an agency denies a request under the Act, its
written response must “include a statement of the specific exception authorizing the
withholding of the record and a brief explanation of how the exception applies to the
record withheld.” KRS 61.880(1). Its response cannot be merely “limited and
perfunctory.” Edmondson v. Alig, 926 S.W.2d 856, 858 (Ky. 1996). Here, the Authority
stated it “denied” the request because the “request is for information, rather than a
request for specifically described records.” And the Authority did not assert it was
withholding any responsive records, but stated it “produced all responsive records.”
The Act applies to requests for specifically described records, not requests for
information. See KRS 61.872(2)(a). Therefore, the Office cannot find that the
Authority violated the Act.

Third, the Appellant asserted the Authority “Fail[ed] to Affirmatively State
Nonexistence” of any records. A public agency discharges its duty under the Act by
affirmatively so stating. 99-ORD-150. A statement from a public agency that it has
provided all records within its possession is “tantamount to an affirmative statement
that the remaining records requested do not exist.” 04-ORD-040. Here, the Authority
stated it “produced all responsive records.” Thus, the Authority discharged its duty
under the Act.

2 The Appellant also makes allegations related to the Authority’s “Statutory Authority Requiring
Uniform Complaint Procedures” and others that are unrelated to the Act. However, allegations such
as these, which do not involve an assertion that the Act was violated, are beyond the scope of this
appeal under KRS 61.880(2), and therefore, the Office cannot resolve them.

A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating an action in the
appropriate circuit court under KRS 61.880(5) and KRS 61.882 within 30 days from
the date of this decision. Under KRS 61.880(3), the Attorney General shall be notified
of any action in circuit court, but shall not be named as a party in that action or in
any subsequent proceedings. The Attorney General will accept notice of the complaint
emailed to [email protected].

Russell Coleman
Attorney General

/s/ Matthew Ray
Matthew Ray
Assistant Attorney General

Mohamed Aly
Gerald W. Florence
Patrick Riley
Tracy W. Carroll