26-OMD-028 – Katie Johnson/London City Council

Opinion Content:

January 28, 2026

In re: Katie Johnson/London City Council

Summary: The London City Council (“the Council”) did not violate the
Open Meetings Act (“the Act”) by holding its meeting at a location that
was inconvenient to the public.

Open Meetings Decision

On December 9, 2025, in a written complaint submitted under KRS 61.846(1),
Katie Johnson (“the Appellant”) alleged that the Commission had violated the Act
because it held its December 3, 2025, meeting in a room with insufficient capacity to
hold all individuals who sought to attend the meeting and therefore violated KRS
61.840, which requires agencies to “provide meeting room conditions, including
adequate space, seating, and acoustics, which insofar as is feasible allow effective
public observation of the public meetings.” As a remedy, the Appellant proposed that
the Council acknowledge the violation, nullify any action taken, reconduct the
meeting at a larger venue, and explain how it will prevent similar violations in the
further.

In response, the Council denied it had violated KRS 61.840, stating that no
individuals were actually excluded from the Council’s meeting room. However, the
Council further stated that, although it denies having violated the Act, it would hold
a future meeting to again discuss the same subjects as were discussed on December
3.1 This appeal followed.

When a public agency conducts a meeting under the Act, it is required to
“provide meeting room conditions, including adequate space, seating, and acoustics,

1 “If the public agency makes efforts to remedy the alleged violation pursuant to the complaint,
efforts to remedy the alleged violation shall not be admissible as evidence of wrongdoing in an
administrative or judicial proceeding.” KRS 61.846(1). Therefore, the Council’s decision to hold a
future meeting on the same matters at a location capable of holding a larger number of attendees has
no bearing on how the Office decides the present appeal.

which insofar as is feasible allow effective public observation of the public meeting.”
KRS 61.840. According to the Appellant, the Mayor of London had declined to call the
December 3 meeting to order because he believed the number of attendees at the
meeting would necessarily violate KRS 61.840. The Appellant further alleges the
Council disagreed and began the meeting. Allegedly, “[n]umerous members of the
public . . . were unable to hear deliberation[s]” and “others were entirely excluded
from attendance.”

For its part, the Council disagrees with the Appellant’s assessment of the
meeting. It states that “there is no evidence that any member of the [Council]
excluded anyone from the meeting” and that “there was room in the meeting room for
the crowd, if people elected to stand along the walls or sit on the floor.” Moreover, the
Council alleged, some of the attendees were at the meeting solely to create the alleged
capacity issues.

Regarding the ability of attendees to hear the proceedings, the Council
describes what was clearly a contentious meeting. According to the Council, during
the meeting “there [were] disruptions from the audience” and the City Police
Department “declined to assist with” enforcing the “chair’s request for order at times
in that meeting.”2

The Supreme Court of Kentucky has held that the Act “does not impose upon
government agencies the requirement to conduct business only in the most
convenient locations at the most convenient times.” Knox Cnty. v. Hammons, 129
S.W.3d 839, 845 (Ky. 2004) (emphasis in original). In Hammons, the Court considered
whether a meeting of a public agency violated KRS 61.840 “because it did not allow
‘effective public observation’ of the proceedings.” Id. at 844. Describing the meeting
in question, the Court stated, “It is undisputed that numerous citizens were not able
to enter the crowded district courtroom and observed the proceedings from the
hallways.” Id. However, the Court ultimately held that the agency had not violated
KRS 61.840 because “there is nothing on the record to indicate that persons wishing
to attend or participate in the proceeding were effectively prevented from doing so.”
Id. at 845. In so holding, the Court stated that the Act is “designed to prevent
government bodies from conducting its business at such inconvenient times or
locations as to effectively render public knowledge or participation impossible, not to
require such agencies to seek out the most convenient time or location.” Id.

This question involved in this appeal, whether the Council had violated KRS
61.840, is substantively similar to the issues presented in 25-OMD-261 and 25-OMD-

2 Both parties also refer to the building being emptied out during the meeting. The Appellant claims
that was because the meeting had been concluded by the Mayor before the Council reconvened it. The
Council claims that an unnamed individual pulled the fire alarm of the building with the goal of
disrupting the meeting.

305. Those decisions concerned meetings of the Council that, like the December 3
meeting, were attended by a large number of individuals who took up all available
seating. In those previous decisions, the Office reasoned that those meetings were
analogous to the meeting at issue in Hammons, insofar as citizens at both meetings
“were not able to enter the crowded [room] and observed the proceedings from the
hallway.” Id. at 844. Ultimately, in Hammons, the Court reasoned that, although the
meeting room in question “might not have been the most convenient . . . location to
hold the meeting, it certainly was not an inconvenient . . . location. The fact that a
large number of citizens did attend proves this point.” Id. at 845. Based on Hammons,
the Office held that, although the Council’s meeting room may not have been the most
convenient location, the fact that a large number of citizens were able to attend the
meeting demonstrates that it was not an inconvenient location.

The record in the present appeal presents no basis for the Office to depart from
its prior analysis. The fact that a large number of citizens were able to attend the
Council’s December 3 meeting, standing alone, is not sufficient for the Office to find
that the Council violated KRS 61.840. Rather, the ability of a large number of citizens
to attend that meeting demonstrates that the meeting was not held at an
inconvenient location. At bottom, the record before the Office does not indicate that
the Council’s meeting location was so inconvenient “as to effectively render public
knowledge or participation impossible.” Accordingly, the Office cannot find that the
Council violated KRS 61.840.

Turning to the Appellant’s claim that attendees were not able to hear the
proceedings, the Act requires a public agency to “provide meeting room conditions,
including adequate space, seating, and acoustics.” KRS 61.840. Here, the parties
disagree on the source of acoustics problems at the December 3 meeting. The
Appellant claims microphones were not activated or used. The Council claims certain
attendees were disruptive during the meeting. As such, the parties disagree
regarding who was at fault for acoustic disruptions at the December 3 meeting.

Ultimately, this dispute presents a factual dispute beyond what the Office is
authorized to adjudicate. Under KRS 61.846(2), the Office cannot resolve competing
factual claims about what may or may not have transpired at the meeting. See, e.g.,
00-OMD-169. The Act does not permit the Office to issue subpoenas, take testimony,
or judge the credibility of witnesses. Nor could it, even if authorized to do so, in the
short time frame allowed this Office to render a decision. See KRS 61.846(2)
(requiring the Attorney General to issue a decision within ten business days).
Disputes that turn heavily on competing evidence are better suited for review in
circuit court. See KRS 61.848; see also 25-OMD-110. The Office cannot resolve the
dispute between the parties regarding who was responsible for the disruptions at the
December 3 meeting and the source of any acoustics issues the attendees had at that

meeting. Therefore, the Office cannot find that the Council violated the Act by
conducting a meeting that was inaudible to the attendees.

A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating an action in the
appropriate circuit court pursuant to KRS 61.846(4)(a). The Attorney General shall
be notified of any action in circuit court, but shall not be named as a party in that
action or in any subsequent proceedings. The Attorney General will accept notice of
the complaint emailed to [email protected].

Russell Coleman
Attorney General

/s/ Zachary M. Zimmerer
Zachary M. Zimmerer
Assistant Attorney General

Katie Johnson
Kelly Green, Presiding Chair, London City Council
Christopher Wiest, Esq., Counsel, London City Council