26-ORD-047 – Damon Cruse/Taylor County Sheriff’s Office

Opinion Number: 26-ORD-047

Date Issued: 2/12/2026

Parties: Damon Cruse/Taylor County Sheriff’s Office

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Opinion Content:

February 12, 2026

In re: Damon Cruse/Taylor County Sheriff’s Office

Summary: The Taylor County Sheriff’s Office (“the Sheriff’s Office”)
did not violate the Open Records Act (“the Act”) when it did not provide
records that do not exist.

Open Records Decision

Damon Cruse (“the Appellant”) submitted a request to the Sheriff’s Office for
the “Sheriff’s report on an incident” in which the Appellant’s vehicle was stopped on
April 13, 2021, along with body camera footage and “all audio-video communications”
between the Sheriff’s Office and the Kentucky State Police related to the incident. In
response, the Sheriff’s Office stated it had no records because it was not involved in
the traffic stop. The Sheriff’s Office provided a printed report showing that the traffic
stop was conducted by the Campbellsville Police Department. Further, the Sheriff’s
Office stated that “Taylor County 911 Dispatch could find no information relating to
[the Sheriff’s Office] and the traffic stop,” nor could the Sheriff “find [any] information
concerning any communication between anyone in [the] Sheriff’s Office and the
Kentucky State Police for this date.” This appeal followed.

Once a public agency states affirmatively that no responsive records exist, the
burden shifts to the requester to make a prima facie case that the records do or should
exist. See Bowling v. Lexington–Fayette Urb. Cnty. Gov’t, 172 S.W.3d 333, 341 (Ky.
2005). If the requester makes a prima facie case that the records do or should exist,
“then the agency may also be called upon to prove that its search was adequate.” City
of Fort Thomas v. Cincinnati Enquirer, 406 S.W.3d 842, 848 n.3 (Ky. 2013) (citing
Bowling, 172 S.W.3d at 341). A requester must provide some evidence to make a
prima facie case that requested records exist, such as the existence of a statute or
regulation requiring the creation of the requested record or other factual support for
the existence of the records. See, e.g., 21-ORD-177; 11-ORD-074. A requester’s bare
assertion that certain records should exist is insufficient to make a prima facie case
that the records actually do exist. See, e.g., 22-ORD-040.

Here, the Appellant presents no evidence that the Sheriff’s Office possesses, or
should possess, records related to the traffic stop. Moreover, on appeal, the Sheriff’s
Office provides a Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) report showing the Campbellsville
Police Department and the Kentucky State Police as the only agencies involved in the
incident. Thus, the Appellant has not made a prima facie case that any responsive
records do or should exist in the possession, custody, or control of the Sheriff’s Office.
Accordingly, the Office cannot find that the Sheriff’s Office violated the Act.

A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating an action in the
appropriate circuit court pursuant to KRS 61.880(5) and KRS 61.882 within 30 days
from the date of this decision. Pursuant to KRS 61.880(3), the Attorney General shall
be notified of any action in circuit court, but shall not be named as a party in that
action or in any subsequent proceedings. The Attorney General will accept notice of
the complaint emailed to [email protected].

Russell Coleman
Attorney General

/s/ James M. Herrick
James M. Herrick
Assistant Attorney General

Damon Cruse, #329951
Dicky Benningfield, Sheriff
John Bertram, Esq.


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