26-ORD-137 – Derek Woods/Kentucky Department of Juvenile Justice

Opinion Content:

March 30, 2026

In re: Derek Woods/Kentucky Department of Juvenile Justice

Summary: The Kentucky Department of Juvenile Justice (“the
Department”) subverted the intent of the Open Records Act (“the Act”)
when it failed to produce records within its own self-imposed deadline.
The Department did not violate the Act when it did not provide records
not responsive to the request, when it explained its redactions made
under KRS 61.878(1)(a), or when it did not explain the edits made to a
record.

Open Records Decision

On January 12, 2026, Derek Woods (“the Appellant”) submitted a lengthy
request to the Department seeking five categories of records: (1) “Records related to
my 2022 reappointment and salary determination”; (2) “Records concerning judicial
branch (AOC) to [Department] appointments”; (3) “Records related to similarly
situated employees and pay comparators”; (4) Records concerning pay equity,
compression, and corrective adjustments”; and (5) “Records related to [the
Appellant’s] salary equity inquiries.” Each category contained specific sub-requests
seeking more specific types of records. Among those was a request for
communications involving four Department employees or the Department’s human
resources staff that discuss the Appellant’s “salary, pay equity concerns, or
compensation review requests” and were sent between January 1, 2023, and the date
of the request.

On January 20, 2026, the Department invoked KRS 61.872(5), stating that
records found in the email accounts of four of its employees were not available because
they “may be located in electronic files of various employees” and it would conduct a
“forensic search with the assistance of the Commonwealth Office of Technology.” The
Department stated that the records would be provided by January 27, 2026. On that
date, the Department extended its delay to February 16, 2026, due to the amount of
“potentially responsive records.” On February 16, the Department issued its final

response, providing all responsive records with redactions made under
KRS 61.878(1)(a).

Under KRS 61.880(1), a public agency has five business days to fulfill or deny
a request for public records. This period may be extended if the records are “in active
use, in storage or not otherwise available,” but the agency must give “a detailed
explanation of the cause . . . for further delay and the place, time, and earliest date
on which the public record[s] will be available for inspection.” KRS 61.872(5). Under
KRS 61.880(4), a person may petition the Attorney General to review an agency’s
action if the “person feels the intent of [the Act] is being subverted by an agency short
of denial of inspection, including but not limited to . . . delay past the five (5) day
period described in [KRS 61.880(1) or] excessive extensions of time.”

Here, the Department’s initial response invoked KRS 61.872(5), stating it
needed additional time to respond fully. Though the Department stated the records
would be available for inspection on January 27, it did not make any records available
by that date. Instead, it delayed the inspection to February 16. The Office has found
that a public agency does not comply with KRS 61.872(5) when it notifies the
requester of the earliest date on which requested records would be available but then
misses its self-imposed deadline. See, e.g., 25-ORD-086; 23-ORD-079; 21-ORD-011.
Therefore, the Department subverted the intent of the Act by delay and excessive
extensions of time, within the meaning of KRS 61.880(4), when it failed to make a
final disposition of the Appellant’s request by the date on which it said the records
would be made available.

Regarding the Department’s final response, the Appellant complains that the
Department had stated it possessed 2.2 gigabytes of “potentially responsive records”
but ultimately provided only 148 megabytes of records. According to the Appellant,
the Department must explain the discrepancy between the size of its initial estimate
of records and the size of its ultimate production. The Appellant is incorrect. The
Office has held that when the “’material is non-responsive, the public agency is not
required to cite a statutory exception to justify its denial.” 16-ORD-138; see also 26-
ORD-127 (finding no violation when a public agency estimated that it possessed 800
pages of responsive records but ultimately determined that it only possessed 614
pages of responsive records). Here, the Department explains that it informed the
Appellant that it possessed 2.2 gigabytes of “potentially responsive records” that it
would need to review “to determine responsiveness.” The Act does not require the
Department to explain the nonproduction of nonresponsive records. Thus, the Office
finds no violation of the Act on this basis.

The Appellant also alleges the Department failed to explain its reliance on
KRS 61.878(1)(a) to redact the records. That statute exempts “records containing
information of a personal nature where the public disclosure thereof would constitute

a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” The Appellant complains that
the Department only identified the categories of information it was redacting. But
such a response does not violate the Act. Rather, public agencies may categorically
redact information such as dates of birth, social security numbers, personal telephone
numbers, personnel ID numbers, a driver’s license number, and medical information.
See Ky. New Era, Inc. v. City of Hopkinsville, 415 S.W.3d 76, 89 (Ky. 2013) (affirming
the “categorical redaction” of personal information regarding private individuals
found in law enforcement records). The Department clearly stated what categories of
information it redacted. In doing so, it satisfied the requirements of the Act.

Finally, the Appellant complains that the Department did not explain why it
provided two different versions of the same email and did not provide it in a particular
format. First, the Act does not require public agencies to fulfill requests for
information, but only requests for records. See KRS 61.872(2)(a) (a request to inspect
records must include a description of “the records to be inspected”). Therefore, the
Department satisfied the Act when it provided responsive emails; it was not required
to provide an explanation of the history of the emails. Second, the Department
correctly points out that the Appellant did not request that the documents be
provided in any particular format. Therefore, the Department was not required to
provide the responsive emails in a particular format. 1 As such, the Office finds no
violation on this basis.

A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating an action in the
appropriate circuit court pursuant to KRS 61.880(5) and KRS 61.882 within 30 days
from the date of this decision. Pursuant to KRS 61.880(3), the Attorney General shall
be notified of any action in circuit court but shall not be named as a party in that
action or in any subsequent proceedings. The Attorney General will accept notice of
the complaint emailed to [email protected].

Russell Coleman
Attorney General

/s/ Zachary M. Zimmerer
Zachary M. Zimmerer
Assistant Attorney General

1 On appeal, the Department states that the Appellant may submit a specific request for specific
formats of the relevant emails.

Derek Woods, Appellant
Nathan Goens, Assistant General Counsel, Justice and Public Safety Cabinet
Charles Bates, Staff Attorney III, Justice and Public Safety Cabinet
Sara Talarigo, Paralegal, Justice and Public Safety Cabinet
Ann Smith, Executive Staff Advisor, Justice and Public Safety Cabinet