26-ORD-186 – Chad Schmidt/City of Newport

Opinion Content:

May 1, 2026

In re: Chad Schmidt/City of Newport

Summary: The City of Newport (“the City”) did not violate the Open
Records Act (“the Act”) when it refused to accept, as a statement of
residency, the address of a post office accompanied by a statement that
the requester was “a licensed citizen of Kentucky.” However, the City
violated the Act when it denied requests for copies of public records
relating to a requester who presented appropriate identification under
KRS 61.884. The City properly denied a request for copies of body-worn
camera recordings, but must allow the requester to view the footage on
City premises under KRS 61.168(5)(d).

Open Records Decision

This appeal concerns two requests for public records submitted to the City by
Chad Schmidt (“the Appellant”). In his first request, the Appellant sought copies of
“all documents/evidence related to [his] criminal trespassing citation,” including body
camera footage and “paperwork/logs sent by Newport on the Levee’s staff to” the
Newport Police Department. The second request, more specifically, sought copies of
body-worn camera footage and “documentation” of the Appellant’s “interaction with”
a named police officer in connection with the same incident. In both requests, the
Appellant listed his address as 420 Columbia Street in Newport, Kentucky, and
provided the following statement as to how he qualified as a resident of the
Commonwealth of Kentucky: “I am a licensed citizen of Kentucky.” The City denied
the Appellant’s requests on the grounds that he did “not qualify as a bona fide
resident of Kentucky.” More specifically, the City asserted that “[m]erely stating you
are a licensed citizen of Kentucky does not qualify” and that “the address [the
Appellant] provided is that of the Newport Post Office where no one resides.” This
appeal followed.

Under KRS 61.872(2)(a), “[a]ny resident of the Commonwealth shall have the
right to inspect public records.” A public agency “may require the applicant to provide
a statement in the written application of the manner in which the applicant is a

resident of the Commonwealth under KRS 61.870(10)(a) to (f).” Id. The Act defines
“resident of the Commonwealth” in KRS 61.870(10) as:

(a) An individual residing in the Commonwealth;
(b) A domestic business entity with a location in the Commonwealth;
(c) A foreign business entity registered with the Secretary of State;
(d) An individual that is employed and works at a location or locations
within the Commonwealth;
(e) An individual or business entity that owns real property within the
Commonwealth;
(f) Any individual or business entity that has been authorized to act
on behalf of an individual or business entity defined in paragraphs
(a) to (e) of this subsection; or
(g) A news-gathering organization as defined in KRS 189.635(9)(b)1.a.
to e.

Here, the Appellant stated he was “a licensed citizen of Kentucky,” which is not one
of the qualifications listed in KRS 61.870(10).

On appeal, the Appellant claims he has “never resided anywhere other than
Kentucky.” Although that statement might be sufficient to qualify him as a resident
of the Commonwealth under KRS 61.870(10)(a), the Appellant did not include a
statement of that nature in his requests to the City. As the Office has previously
noted, KRS 61.876(4)(e)2. “allows a public agency to require a statement, at the time
of the request, as to ‘the manner in which the requester is a resident of the
Commonwealth under KRS 61.870(1)(a) to (f).’” 26-ORD-032. Thus, the City’s
response to the Appellant’s requests must be evaluated based on the information
presented to the City at that time.

The Appellant further argues that his inclusion of a Kentucky address in his
requests was sufficient to state the manner in which he was a resident of the
Commonwealth. Including a “residential address” within Kentucky constitutes a
sufficient statement that the requester is an “individual residing in the
Commonwealth” under KRS 61.870(10)(a). 24-ORD-021. On the other hand, the mere
“[u]se of a post office box” in Kentucky “does not mean that an individual resides in
the Commonwealth.” 25-ORD-397. As the City points out, the address the Appellant
provided is that of the United States Post Office in Newport, Kentucky, not a
residential address. The City “is not required to simply accept a statement of
residency that it knows to be false.” 25-ORD-156. Thus, to the extent the Appellant
relies on the address of a post office as a statement of the manner in which he is a
resident of the Commonwealth, the City did not violate the Act when it concluded he
had failed to include a valid statement of residency.

In this case, however, the Appellant’s statement of residency is not the end of
the inquiry. The Appellant cites KRS 61.884, which provides “[a]ny person shall have
access to any public record relating to him or in which he is mentioned by name, upon
presentation of appropriate identification. . . .” Because the records requested by the
Appellant relate to him, he argues he is entitled to receive copies of them under
KRS 61.884, despite the limitation of the right of inspection to “[a]ny resident of the
Commonwealth” under KRS 61.872(2)(a).

There is no conflict between KRS 61.872 and KRS 61.884. Under KRS 61.872,
only a “resident of the Commonwealth” may inspect public records, “except as
otherwise provided by” the Act. KRS 61.872(1) (emphasis added). In turn, KRS 61.884
“otherwise provide[s],” allowing “[a]ny person” to obtain public records “relating to
him or in which he is mentioned by name.” Based on the text of these two sections,
the requirement in KRS 61.872 that only a resident of the Commonwealth may obtain
public records under the Act gives way to the broader right of access to records
relating to the requester under KRS 61.884.

But even if KRS 61.872’s residency requirement is deemed to conflict with
KRS 61.884, in such a case, “the more specific statute controls over the more general
statute.” Light v. City of Louisville, 248 S.W.3d 559, 563 (Ky. 2008). Here, KRS 61.872
applies to public records more generally, whereas KRS 61.884 applies specifically to
public records “relating to” the requester. Therefore, the Appellant is correct that the
right of inspection under KRS 61.884 applies to any person, including him, and not
merely to residents of the Commonwealth. 1

However, KRS 61.884 does not prescribe the manner in which public records
may be inspected under that provision. 2 At this point, it is appropriate to consider
the legislative history of the Act in relation to the manner of inspection. KRS 61.884
is one of the original provisions of the Act and has remained unaltered since its
enactment in 1976. Prior to the 1992 enactment of KRS 61.872(3), the general right
to inspect public records was contained within KRS 61.872(2), which at that time
stated: “Any person shall have the right to inspect public records during the regular
office hours of the public agency. The official custodian may require written
application describing the records to be inspected.” Thus, viewing records in person
on the premises of the public agency was the only recognized means of inspection in
1976.

With the 1992 amendments, however, the Act for the first time allowed “[a]
person” to inspect records not only “[d]uring the regular office hours of the public

1 Cf. 24-ORD-034 n.1 (noting KRS 61.880(2)(a) allows “a complaining party,” not only a “resident of
the Commonwealth,” to appeal a denial of inspection to the Attorney General).
2 Cf. 23-ORD-272 n.3 (noting KRS 61.884 “does not specify the procedure by which a person must
request records that mention him” and referring to KRS 61.872 for guidance).

agency,” KRS 61.872(3)(a), but alternatively, “[b]y receiving copies of the public
records from the public agency through the mail,” if the requester is “a person whose
residence or principal place of business is outside the county in which the public
records are located” and the records are “precisely describe[d].” KRS 61.872(3)(b). As
the Office noted at the time, this amendment “reflects a concern that persons residing
outside the county where the records are maintained should not be compelled to
travel great distances in order to inspect those records.” 92-ORD-1620. In 2021,
however, the General Assembly limited the right to inspect public records under
KRS 61.872(3)(a) and (b) to “[a] resident of the Commonwealth” instead of “[a]
person.”

In light of this history, the question is whether a nonresident of the
Commonwealth may inspect public records relating to him by receiving copies
through the mail, or only by inspecting them in person during regular business
hours. 3 Because the 2021 amendment to KRS 61.872(3), changing “[a] person” to “[a]
resident of the Commonwealth,” applies to subsections (a) and (b) alike, there is no
basis to infer a legislative intent specifically to require nonresidents to travel to
Kentucky to inspect records relating to them. Moreover, it would lead to absurd
results if a person outside Kentucky were subjected to such a requirement while a
resident of a different county in Kentucky is not. Therefore, it is reasonable to
conclude that a nonresident seeking records relating to him under KRS 61.884 may
avail himself of either means of inspection set forth in KRS 61.872(3). Accordingly,
such a person may obtain copies of precisely-described records relating to him as
provided in KRS 61.872(3)(b).

KRS 61.884 imposes the further condition of a “presentation of appropriate
identification.” However, the statute neither defines what form of identification is
“appropriate” nor specifies the manner of “presentation.” Here, the Appellant claims
he provided a copy of his valid driver’s license, which the City does not dispute. 4 Given
that the Appellant requested to inspect records by receiving copies, rather than
inspecting in person, the Office finds the Appellant complied with the “presentation”
requirement of KRS 61.884 by furnishing a copy of his driver’s license. Therefore, the
City violated the Act when it denied the Appellant’s requests for copies of public
records relating to him, insofar as the disclosure of those records is governed by the
Act.

3 The Office has noted that a person inspecting public records on agency premises has the ancillary
right “to obtain copies” of such records “[u]pon inspection” under KRS 61.874(1).
4 Although the City claims the “indication” of the Appellant’s address on his license “was
fraudulently obtained” because it is the address of the Newport Post Office, the City does not dispute
the validity of the driver’s license itself as “appropriate identification” of the Appellant under KRS
61.884.

The Appellant’s requests, however, are not entirely governed by the Act. Under
KRS 61.168(2), “the disclosure of body-worn camera recordings shall be governed by”
the Act “[e]xcept as provided in this section.” One of those exceptions is
KRS 61.168(5)(d), which provides: “If the recording contains video or audio footage
that [i]s requested by a person 5 [who] is directly involved in the incident contained in
the body-worn camera recording, it shall be made available by the public agency to
the requesting party for viewing on the premises of the public agency, but the public
agency shall not be required to make a copy of the recording except as provided in
KRS 61.169. 6 The requesting parties shall not be limited in the number of times they
may view the recording under this paragraph” (emphasis added). Thus, insofar as the
Appellant requested body-worn camera footage related to the incident, he may view
the footage on City premises as many times as he wishes, but he is not entitled to
obtain a copy of the recording.

In sum, the City did not violate the Act when it refused to accept the
Appellant’s statement of residency under KRS 61.870(10), but it violated the Act
when it denied the Appellant’s request for copies of public records relating to him,
other than body-worn camera footage, after he presented appropriate identification
under KRS 61.884. The City properly denied the Appellant’s request for copies of
body-worn camera recordings, but it must afford the Appellant unlimited
opportunities to view the footage on City premises under KRS 61.168(5)(d).

A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating an action in the
appropriate circuit court pursuant to KRS 61.880(5) and KRS 61.882 within 30 days
from the date of this decision. Pursuant to KRS 61.880(3), the Attorney General shall
be notified of any action in circuit court, but shall not be named as a party in that
action or in any subsequent proceedings. The Attorney General will accept notice of
the complaint emailed to [email protected].

Russell Coleman
Attorney General

/s/ James M. Herrick
James M. Herrick
Assistant Attorney General

5 Significantly for purposes of this appeal, KRS 61.165(5)(d) does not limit the right to view body-
worn camera footage to residents of the Commonwealth.
6 KRS 61.169, which does not apply here, allows the involved party’s attorney to obtain a copy of a
body-worn camera recording under specified circumstances.

Chad Schmidt
Derick Dieters
Tiffany Meyers, Clerk
Daniel Braun, Esq.