25-ORD-415 – Ricky Ladd/Graves County School District

Opinion Content:

December 18, 2025

In re: Ricky Ladd/Graves County School District

Summary: The Graves County School District (“the District”) violated
the Open Records Act (“the Act”) when it failed to cite the specific
exemption authorizing it to redact public records. However, the District
did not violate the Act when it redacted material from attorney billing
records on the basis of attorney-client privilege and the work product
doctrine.

Open Records Decision

Ricky Ladd (“the Appellant”) submitted a request to the District for “all
invoices, and payment records” mentioning the name of the District’s attorney. In a
timely response, the District provided copies of the records, but redactions were made
to most of the descriptions of services in the attorney’s billing records. This appeal
followed.

Under KRS 61.880(1), “[a]n agency response denying, in whole or in part,
inspection of any record shall include a statement of the specific exception authorizing
the withholding of the record and a brief explanation of how the exception applies to
the record withheld.” Here, in its initial response, the District cited no exemption
authorizing the redaction of the billing statements, nor did it explain how an
exemption applied. Thus, the District violated the Act.

On appeal, however, the District cites as grounds for redaction “[a]ttorney-
client privilege and the doctrine of attorney work product[,] incorporated into the
[Act] pursuant to KRS 61.878(1)(l), read in conjunction with KRE 403 and CR 26.02.”
The attorney-client privilege protects from disclosure “confidential communication[s]
made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to [a]
client.” KRE 503(b). “A communication is ‘confidential’ if not intended to be disclosed
to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is made in furtherance of the
rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary for
the transmission of the communication.” KRE 503(a)(5). The privilege applies to

communications between a client or representative of a client and the lawyer,
KRE 503(b)(1), as well as between representatives of the client, KRE 503(b)(4).

The attorney work-product doctrine, on the other hand, “affords a qualified
privilege from discovery for documents ‘prepared in anticipation of litigation or for
trial’ by that party’s representative, which includes an attorney.” Univ. of Ky. v.
Lexington H-L Servs., 579 S.W.3d 858, 864 (Ky. App. 2018). “[D]ocuments which are
primarily factual, non-opinion work product are subject to lesser protection than ‘core’
work product, which includes the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories of an attorney.” Id. Here, the redacted work-product material appears in the
attorney’s bills, which he sent to his client. Because the purported attorney work
product “is contained in [the attorney’s] communications to his client, it is not
necessary here to consider the work product separately from the attorney-client
privilege.” 21-ORD-111.

KRS 61.878(1)(l) operates in tandem with KRE 503 to exclude from public
inspection public records protected by the attorney-client privilege. Hahn v. Univ. of
Louisville, 80 S.W.3d 771 (Ky. App. 2001). Records protected by the work-product
doctrine may likewise be withheld from public inspection under KRS 61.878(1)(l) and
CR 26.02(3). See Univ. of Ky., 579 S.W.3d at 864–65. However, when a party invokes
the attorney-client privilege or the work-product doctrine to shield documents in
litigation, that party carries the burden of proof. That is because “broad claims of
‘privilege’ are disfavored when balanced against the need for litigants to have access
to relevant or material evidence.” Haney v. Yates, 40 S.W.3d 352, 355 (Ky. 2000)
(quoting Meenach v. Gen. Motors Corp., 891 S.W.2d 398, 402 (Ky. 1995)).

To provide the “brief explanation of how the exception applies to the record
withheld” that KRS 61.880(1) requires when an agency denies a request, the agency
should provide a sufficient description of the records being withheld under the
privilege to allow the requester to judge the propriety of the agency’s claims, then the
public agency will have discharged its duty. See City of Fort Thomas v. Cincinnati
Enquirer, 406 S.W.3d 842, 848–49 (Ky. 2013) (providing that the agency’s “proof may
and often will include an outline, catalogue, or index of responsive records and an
affidavit by a qualified person describing the contents of withheld records and
explaining why they were withheld.”). 1

In the case of attorney billing records, a “blanket redaction of all descriptive
portions” is improper “without particularized demonstration that each description is
privileged.” Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. Scorsone, 251

1 In correspondence with the District, the Appellant has claimed a “privilege log” must be produced
for any material redacted under the attorney-client privilege. However, the Office’s decisions have not
required a formal privilege log when the agency’s description of the records is sufficient to determine
whether the privilege applies. See, e.g., 21-ORD-140; 21-ORD-087.

S.W.3d 328, 330 (Ky. App. 2008). However, a public agency may redact “information
such as the names of individuals with whom the [attorney] communicated, the subject
matter discussed, topics of research, etc., the disclosure of which ‘could possibly
compromise the agency’s [position] by providing insight into its attorneys’ . . . thought
processes and legal strategy and could properly be classified as substantive legal
matters protected by the attorney-client privilege and work product doctrine’.” 09-
ORD-055 (quoting 05-ORD-049). Thus, the agency need only permit inspection of
those portions describing, “in general terms, the nature of the services provided such
as, for example, ‘review and analyze letter,’ ‘research and analyze,’ ‘preparation of
letter,’ ‘preparation for meeting with the Fiscal Court.’” 05-ORD-029.

Here, the District provided billing statements showing the dates of service, the
attorney providing services, the hourly rate, hours spent, and total charges for each
entry. The District left intact the general terms describing the services provided for
each entry, such as “review,” “phone,” “letter,” “draft,” “email,” and “attend board
meeting,” while redacting only the more specific descriptions it claims are protected
by the attorney-client privilege. Accordingly, the District’s partial redactions to the
descriptions of services did not violate the Act.

A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating an action in the
appropriate circuit court pursuant to KRS 61.880(5) and KRS 61.882 within 30 days
from the date of this decision. Pursuant to KRS 61.880(3), the Attorney General shall
be notified of any action in circuit court, but shall not be named as a party in that
action or in any subsequent proceedings. The Attorney General will accept notice of
the complaint emailed to [email protected].

Russell Coleman
Attorney General

/s/ James M. Herrick
James M. Herrick
Assistant Attorney General

Mr. Ricky Ladd
Jesse E. Wright, Esq.
Ms. Tiffany Williams