Opinion Number: 25-ORD-407
Date Issued: 12/16/2025
Parties: Michael McDaniel/University of Kentucky
Opinion Content:
December 16, 2025
In re: Michael McDaniel/University of Kentucky
Summary: The University of Kentucky (“the University”) did not
violate the Open Records Act (“the Act”) when it denied a request for
records that did not precisely describe the public records requested.
Open Records Decision
On October 13, 2025, Michael McDaniel (“the Appellant”) submitted a three-
part request for records to the University. In Part 1 of the request, the Appellant
sought “[a]ny complaints[,] inquiries, or correspondence” sent to or received from “any
agency or representative of the federal government” that “relate[s] to speech,
expression, or academic freedom at the University.” In Part 2, the Appellant sought
“[a]ny correspondence or communications between [University] administrators,
faculty, or communications staff and any federal government official or agency that
reference or discuss” the following topics: “Employee or student speech, expression,
or social media activity; Free speech policies, enforcement, or investigations; [or]
Federal complaints or directives concerning campus speech, protests, or disciplinary
actions connected to speech.” In Part 3, the Appellant sought “[a]ny internal
correspondence among University officials referring to or discussing pressure,
requests, or guidance from the federal government concerning university decisions or
policies on speech, expression, or public communication.” Each request sought records
dated between January 1, 2019, and the date of the request.
In a timely response, the University denied the request under KRS 61.872(6)
because the “request does not provide the University with enough information to
conduct any proper research contributing to the unreasonably burdensome nature of
your request.” This appeal followed.
When a person requests copies of public records under the Act, “[t]he public
agency shall mail copies of the public records to a person . . . after he or she precisely
describes the public records which are readily available within the public agency.”
KRS 61.872(3)(b). A description is precise “if it describes the records in definite,
specific, and unequivocal terms.” 98-ORD-17 (internal quotation marks omitted).
This standard may not be met when a request does not “describe records by type,
origin, county, or any identifier other than relation to a subject.” 20-ORD-017
(quoting 13-ORD-077). Requests for any and all records “related to a broad and ill-
defined topic” generally fail to precisely describe the records. 22-ORD-182; see also
21-ORD-034 (finding a request for any and all records relating to “change of duties,”
“freedom of speech,” or “usage of signs” did not precisely describe the records); but see
Univ. of Ky. v. Kernel Press, Inc., 620 S.W.3d 43, 48 n.2 (Ky. 2021) (holding a request
was proper when it sought “all records detailing [the] resignation” of a specific
employee). A request that does not precisely describe the records “places an
unreasonable burden on the agency to produce often incalculable numbers of widely
dispersed and ill-defined public records.” 99-ORD-14.
Part 1 of the request sought any “complaints[,] inquiries, or correspondence”
between the University and any representative of the Federal Government for a six-
and-a-half-year period. The only limiting factors were the broad topics of “speech,
expression, or academic freedom at the University.” Likewise, Part 2 of the request
also sought records sent between University staff and “any federal government
official or agency” referencing similarly broad topics. Under the Act, a “requester is
required to describe the records he or she seeks so as to make locating them
reasonably possible.” City of Fort Thomas v. Cincinnati Enquirer, 406 S.W.3d 842,
855 (Ky. 2013). Regarding Parts 1 and 2 of the request, the listed topics are “broad
and ill-defined.” Moreover, the University cannot reasonably be expected to know
every representative of the Federal Government it has been in contact with for a
period of nearly seven years. Cf. 25-ORD-300 (finding the Kentucky State Police could
not be charged with knowledge of the names and functions of members of an FBI task
force). As such, the requester has not precisely described the records sought in Parts
1 and 2 of his request.
Part 3 of the Appellant’s request also seeks a broad and ill-defined range of
records. That request sought any correspondence among “University officials” which
discuss “pressure, requests, or guidance from the federal government concerning
university decisions or policies on speech, expression, or public communication.”
First, it is unclear who is included in the term “University official.” That term is
undefined and could reasonably be interpreted as seeking communications between
any employee of the University. 1 Moreover, the identified topics provided by the
Appellant are also broad and ill-defined and do not make it reasonably possible for
the University to determine whether a particular record is responsive to the request.
1 The Appellant has stated that his request “includes but is not limited to communications by or to”
five different University offices. Because that list is nonexclusive, it does not meaningfully clarify the
scope of the request.
Here, each part of the Appellant’s request sought records concerning ill-defined
topics sent to or from an unclear swath of employees within the University and
persons outside the University. Given the broad scope of the request, the Appellant
has not “precisely describe[d] the public records which are readily available within
the public agency,” as is required by KRS 61.872(3)(b). Accordingly, the University
did not violate the Act when it denied the Appellant’s request.
A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating an action in the
appropriate circuit court pursuant to KRS 61.880(5) and KRS 61.882 within 30 days
from the date of this decision. Pursuant to KRS 61.880(3), the Attorney General shall
be notified of any action in circuit court, but shall not be named as a party in that
action or in any subsequent proceedings. The Attorney General will accept notice of
the complaint emailed to [email protected].
Russell Coleman
Attorney General
/s/ Zachary M. Zimmerer
Zachary M. Zimmerer
Assistant Attorney General
Mr. Michael McDaniel
William E. Thro, Esq.
Ms. Amy R. Spagnuolo
