26-ORD-098 – Sam Aguiar/Louisville Metro Government

Opinion Content:

March 16, 2026

In re: Sam Aguiar/Louisville Metro Government

Summary: The Louisville Metro Government (“Metro”) did not violate
the Open Records Act (“the Act”) by denying a request that did not
comply with KRS 61.872(3)(b) by precisely describing the records.

Open Records Decision

On December 26, 2025, Sam Aguiar (“the Appellant”) submitted a request to
Metro for copies of “[a]ll existing records sufficient to show [Metro’s] costs, payments,
or financial obligations arising from the November 4, 2025 UPS Flight 2976 crash,
for the period of November 4, 2025 through December 16, 2025.” 1 Metro denied the
request on January 2, 2026, “as an unreasonable burden under KRS 61.872(6).” Metro
stated the Appellant’s request “lists general types of expenses that might arise from
an event, but on the whole, it is a request for an exhaustive search for all financial
records arising from a catastrophic event.” In addition, Metro cited 05-ORD-014 and
99-ORD-14 for the proposition that a requester has a duty to describe records “with
sufficient specificity to enable the agency from which the records are being sought to
identify, locate, and retrieve the records.” This appeal followed.

On appeal, Metro explains that the Appellant failed to “precisely describe” the
records he is requesting under KRS 61.872(3)(b). Therefore, Metro argues, his request
imposes an unreasonable burden on it under KRS 61.872(6).

When a person requests copies of public records under the Act, “[t]he public
agency shall mail copies of the public records to a person . . . after he or she precisely
describes the public records which are readily available within the public agency.”
KRS 61.872(3)(b). A description is precise “if it describes the records in definite,

1 The Appellant specified that responsive records included “invoices, purchase orders,
contracts/SOWs, payment vouchers, reimbursement requests, cost estimates, and cost tracking
spreadsheets, relating to debris removal, environmental testing, cleanup/remediation, site security,
traffic control, emergency response support, and victim assistance expenditures.”

specific, and unequivocal terms.” 98-ORD-17 (internal quotation marks omitted).
This standard may not be met when a request does not “describe records by type,
origin, county, or any identifier other than relation to a subject.” 20-ORD-017
(quoting 13-ORD-077); see also 23-ORD-066 (holding that a request for all “Cease and
Desist orders” issued by the agency or any of its organizational units for a specified
period, to merit and non-merit employees, did not precisely describe the records under
KRS 61.872(3)(b) because a “cease and desist order” is not a generally recognized
category of record the agency creates or maintains). In particular, a request for any
and all records “related to a broad and ill-defined topic” generally fails to precisely
describe the records. 22-ORD-182; see also 21-ORD-034 (finding a request for any and
all records relating to “change of duties,” “freedom of speech,” or “usage of signs” did
not precisely describe the records); but see Univ. of Ky. v. Kernel Press, Inc., 620
S.W.3d 43, 48 n.2 (Ky. 2021) (holding a request was proper when it sought “all records
detailing [the] resignation” of a named employee). A request that does not precisely
describe the records “places an unreasonable burden on the agency to produce often
incalculable numbers of widely dispersed and ill-defined public records.” 99-ORD-14.

The requirement that a request for copies of records contain a precise
description of the records sought, KRS 61.872(3)(b), applies regardless of whether
copies are sought in hard copy or electronic format because “the difficulties associated
with identifying and locating all responsive documents . . . are the same when, as in
this case, the records are not searchable based on the criteria provided.” 23-ORD-066;
16-ORD-242.

Here, the Appellant requested “[a]ll existing records sufficient to show” all the
costs, payments, or financial obligations that Metro incurred following the November
4, 2025, UPS Flight 2976 crash, for the period of November 4 to December 16, 2025,
including seven general categories of financial records “relating to” seven different
subcategories. On appeal, Metro explains that that the Appellant’s request, as
written, does not meaningfully identify specific records.

First, although the Appellant identified a single event—the UPS Flight 2976
crash—Metro’s response “up to the time of the request encompassed a multitude of
agencies and entities, including non-Metro entities, over eight weeks.” Its response
included “firefighting, public safety, medical services, financial management,
infrastructure, coordination with federal agencies, and providing varied social
services [and] [t]he crash resulted in the deaths of people on the ground and the crew,
massive fire, damage to property and infrastructure, and varied environmental
impacts.” Metro identified a minimum of 11 different Metro agencies that likely
incurred costs from the crash and explained that the “financial obligations incurred
by the whole of Metro Government after the kind of widespread destruction created
by Flight 2976 cover nearly every aspect of public service.”

Moreover, Metro argues that the Appellant’s list of general categories provided
only “creates a broad floor for the scope of the search.” Metro explains that the
Appellant’s “‘categories’ cover everything a government would do over the course of
dealing with a catastrophe, from immediate and undefined ‘emergency response
support’ to the catch-all of ‘cleanup.’” Further broadening the request, those
categories are intended to encompass every record “relating to” seven undefined cost
factors. Thus, Metro maintains that the Appellant has not described the records
sought with sufficient precision to allow it to identify responsive records as required
by KRS 61.872(3)(b). The Office agrees with Metro’s assessment of the Appellant’s
request and finds the Appellant failed to “precisely describe” the records that he is
requesting as KRS 61.872(3)(b) requires. 2

In 15-ORD-212, a request for copies of records “documenting the contacts
and/or communications” by detectives of the Lexington Police Department with
judges, law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, or “any person of the public nature,”
that was unlimited in temporal scope, did not satisfy the standard of KRS
61.872(3)(b). Even with a specified temporal scope, however, a request for copies of
“[a]ny and all records related to the granting of easements by the City of Indian Hills
to its property owners for the purpose of connecting to any MSD sewer line … from
January 1, 1990, to January 1, 1999” also lacked the precise description that KRS
61.872(3)(b) requires. 00-ORD-79. Similarly, a request specifying the temporal scope
for “records indicative of [a named individual’s] assistance with Kentucky State Police
matters, including tips given to [the] department” failed to describe an identifiable
class of records and was properly denied. 13-ORD-077; 20-ORD-017 (holding that a
request for “documents evidencing communications” by the Governor or his
administrative staff with a particular agency on specific subjects, unlimited in
temporal scope, did not comply with KRS 61.872(3)(b) and was properly denied).

The ambiguity in “[a]ll existing records sufficient to show” is analogous to
“records documenting . . . contacts and/or communications,” “records indicative of . . .
assistance,” and “documents evidencing communications.” The request fails to
identify a specific set of records limited “by type . . . or any identifier other than
relation to a subject.” 13-ORD-077. Whether a record is “sufficient to show” costs,
payments, or financial obligations regarding a specific event is a characterization

2 The Appellant maintains there is a significant public interest regarding the November 4, 2025,
UPS Flight 2976 crash, that “strongly favors disclosure” and Metro had a duty to communicate with
him to narrow the scope of the request if necessary. However, a determination of whether the
Appellant’s request was properly framed is not dependent on the level of public interest regarding the
crash. Rather, employing such a balancing test is appropriate when the Office is asked to determine
whether a public agency has properly redacted or withheld public records under KRS 61.878(1)(a).
Likewise, Metro correctly argues that a public agency may communicate directly with a requester
concerning the scope of his request but is not required by the Act to do so.

subject to interpretation, rendering the description “so nonspecific as to preclude the
custodian from determining what, if any, existing records it might encompass.” 96-
ORD-101. Because the Appellant did not “precisely describe records which are readily
available within the public agency,” Metro properly denied his request under KRS
61.872(3)(b). A request that does not precisely describe the records “places an
unreasonable burden on the agency to produce often incalculable numbers of widely
dispersed and ill-defined public records.” 3 25-ORD-407; 25-ORD-357; 99-ORD-14.

A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating an action in the
appropriate circuit court pursuant to KRS 61.880(5) and KRS 61.882 within 30 days
from the date of this decision. Pursuant to KRS 61.880(3), the Attorney General shall
be notified of any action in circuit court but shall not be named as a party in that
action or in any subsequent proceedings. The Attorney General will accept notice of
the complaint emailed to [email protected].

Russell Coleman
Attorney General

/s/ Michelle D. Harrison
Michelle D. Harrison
Assistant Attorney General

Sam Aguiar, Appellant
Alice Lyon, Assistant Jefferson County Attorney
Nicole Pang, Assistant Jefferson County Attorney
Natalie S. Johnson, Assistant Jefferson County Attorney
Annale Taylor, Assistant Jefferson County Attorney
Donald Haas, Assistant Jefferson County Attorney
Michael Spenlau, Assistant Jefferson County Attorney
Anne Coorsen, Assistant Jefferson County Attorney

3 Because KRS 61.872(3)(b) is dispositive of the issues presented, further discussion of KRS
61.872(6) is unnecessary.