26-ORD-107 – Jennifer Simpson/Adair County Sheriff’s Office

Opinion Number: 26-ORD-107

Date Issued: 3/19/2026

Parties: Jennifer Simpson/Adair County Sheriff’s Office

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Opinion Content:

March 19, 2026

In re: Jennifer Simpson/Adair County Sheriff’s Office

Summary: The Adair County Sheriff’s Office (“the Sheriff”) violated the
Open Records Act (“the Act”) by not conducting a diligent search for any
existing, responsive records upon receipt of the request and providing
copies of the nonexempt records that search yielded. However, the
Sheriff did not violate the Act by providing copies of the only existing
records that she possesses upon receipt of this appeal. The Office cannot
resolve factual disputes regarding perceived discrepancies between the
records that were requested and those ultimately provided.

Open Records Decision

On February 13, 2026, Jennifer Simpson (“the Appellant”) submitted a
request to the Sheriff seeking “[a]ll records pertaining to The Barn at Cedar [G]rove
[‘the Barn’] located at 1000 Brockman Keltner Rd. Greensburg, KY 42743,” from the
past 20 years. The Appellant explained she was “looking for any records for this
business [reflecting] that the Sheriff’s Office was called for any type of disturbance,
fight, disagreement and/or where somebody was hurt.” Later that day, the Sheriff
advised the Appellant she was “unaware of anything at that location coming through
our office. You are more than welcome to file an open records request with 911
[D]ispatch[.]” 1

Upon receipt of the Sheriff’s response, the Appellant asked whether the Sheriff
had performed a search or was relying on her memory. The Sheriff responded that
her office “was not aware of any other incidents by either paperwork or calls coming
through our location[.] [D]ispatch would be your only source for this information.”
When the Appellant asked for additional clarification regarding how the Sheriff
verified the lack of records, the Sheriff explained, “The Barn at Cedar Grove has only
been an existing venue since 2011 so (14 years [maximum]) most events would
happen during weekends or evenings,” meaning 911 Dispatch would have received

1 The Sheriff also provided the phone number for the 911 Dispatch.

any calls or complaints. For this reason, the Sheriff referred the Appellant again to
911 Dispatch for any such records. This appeal followed.

The Adair County Attorney, responding on behalf of the Sheriff, advised that
the Sheriff had located “reports from two incidents at The Barn at Cedar Grove from
May 2019 and November 2025,” but that the Sheriff does “not have any reports or
records related to [the Appellant’s] incident at The Barn at Cedar Grove.” Upon
receipt of the responsive uniform citations, the Appellant reiterated that she does
“not believe these 2 records are all they have in regard[ ] to my request.” The
Appellant maintains that she was “assaulted at this business . . . on 10-09-24 and
Jamie Richard, Sheriff, showed up with the Kentucky State Police [‘KSP’].” The
Appellant further questions whether there must be some form of “proof” the Sheriff
was present even though KSP handled the related investigation.

When a public agency receives a request to inspect public records, that agency
must decide within five business days “whether to comply with the request” and
notify the requester in writing “of its decision.” KRS 61.880(1). A public agency cannot
simply ignore portions of a request. See, e.g., 21-ORD-090. If the records exist but a
statutory exemption applies that allows the agency to withhold the records, the
agency must cite that exemption and explain how it applies. KRS 61.880(1).
Conversely, if the records do not exist, then the agency must affirmatively state that
the records do not exist following a diligent search for the records. 25-ORD-376. A
public agency responding to an open records request must “expend reasonable efforts
to identify and locate the requested records.” 18-ORD-164; 95-ORD-96. Discharging
this duty entails “a search using methods which can reasonably be expected to
produce the records requested.” Id. (quoting Cerveny v. Cent. Intel. Agency, 445
F. Supp. 772, 775 (D. Col. 1978)); 18-ORD-164. When a subsequent search locates
responsive records that were not found during the initial search, as in this case, the
agency’s initial search “was clearly insufficient to locate all responsive records.” 25-
ORD-376; 25-ORD-165; 21-ORD-242; 21-ORD-178. Because the Sheriff did not
provide the Appellant with any existing, responsive records, her initial search was
necessarily inadequate. However, the Sheriff has now remedied this deficiency and
provided the Appellant with copies of the only existing records in her possession.

Once a public agency states affirmatively that it does not possess any
responsive records, the burden shifts to the requester to make a prima facie case that
the agency does or should possess the requested records. See Bowling v. Lexington–
Fayette Urb. Cnty. Gov’t, 172 S.W.3d 333, 341 (Ky. 2005). If the requester makes a
prima facie case that a public agency possesses the records, “then the agency may
also be called upon to prove that its search was adequate.” City of Fort Thomas v.
Cincinnati Enquirer, 406 S.W.3d 842, 848 n.3 (Ky. 2013) (citing Bowling, 172 S.W.3d
at 341). Here, the Appellant has not made a prima facie case that the Sheriff
possesses additional, responsive records beyond the uniform citations she received.

To support her claim that the Sheriff possesses additional records, the
Appellant relies on her unsubstantiated belief that there should or must be records
documenting the Sheriff’s presence at The Barn on October 9, 2024. However, the
Sheriff’s presence following the incident does not confirm that documentation was
created. Moreover, the Sheriff maintains that she has now provided the Appellant
with copies of the only existing, responsive records that her office possesses. Simply
put, given the scope of this Office’s review under KRS 61.880(2), it cannot resolve
factual disputes between the parties, including a dispute regarding whether the
public agency has provided all responsive records. See, e.g., 22-ORD-010 (declining to
resolve a factual dispute regarding the perceived discrepancy between the records
provided and those requested); 21-ORD-163 (declining to resolve conflicting factual
narratives); 19-ORD-083; 03-ORD-61; OAG 89-81. Here, the Appellant is asking the
Office to make a factual determination regarding what records the Sheriff possesses.
Thus, the Office cannot find that the Sheriff violated the Act when it did not provide
records it does not possess.

A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating an action in the
appropriate circuit court pursuant to KRS 61.880(5) and KRS 61.882 within 30 days
from the date of this decision. Pursuant to KRS 61.880(3), the Attorney General shall
be notified of any action in circuit court but shall not be named as a party in that
action or in any subsequent proceedings. The Attorney General will accept notice of
the complaint emailed to [email protected].

Russell Coleman
Attorney General

/s/ Michelle D. Harrison
Michelle D. Harrison
Assistant Attorney General

Jennifer Simpson, Appellant
Gary Roy, Adair County Sheriff
Jennifer Hutchison-Corbin, Adair County Attorney


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