26-ORD-144 – James Harrison/Department of Corrections

Opinion Content:

April 2, 2026

In re: James Harrison/Department of Corrections

Summary: The Department of Corrections (“the Department”) did not
violate the Open Records Act (“the Act”) in denying a request for copies
of records under KRS 61.872(3)(b) because it did not precisely describe
the records. However, the Office cannot resolve the related factual
dispute regarding when the Department received and responded to the
request.

Open Records Decision

On February 4, 2026, inmate James Harrison (“the Appellant”) mailed a
request to the Department, asking for a copy of the disposition of his January 15,
2026, complaint regarding the “restrictive lockdown” at Eastern Kentucky
Correctional Complex (“EKCC”). On February 25, 2026, the Appellant initiated this
appeal, claiming the Department violated the Act by failing to send a written
response to his request within five business days of receipt. However, upon receiving
the notice of this appeal from the Office, the Department advised it received the
Appellant’s request on February 17, 2026, and sent a timely response per
KRS 197.025(7) by letter dated February 23, 2026. To substantiate its position, the
Department provided a date-stamped copy of the Appellant’s February 4, 2026,
request and a copy of its February 23, 2026, response, which denied the Appellant’s
request under KRS 61.872(3)(b) because it does not “precisely describe” the record he
seeks.

On appeal, the Department further explains that it denied the Appellant’s
request “because it could not search its records based on the criteria provided in the
[request]. The request did not identify a relevant time period for the request or to
whom the complaint was directed, and therefore, [the Department] could not locate
the complaint on which the requested disposition was premised.” In short, because
the Department was unable to “locate the alleged complaint, it could not conduct a
search for a record of its disposition in response to that alleged complaint.” Citing
City of Fort Thomas v. Cincinnati Enquirer, 406 S.W.3d 842 (Ky. 2013), and prior

decisions by the Office construing KRS 61.872(3)(b), the Department explains that
the Appellant’s request “did not describe records by type, origin, county, or any
identifier other than relation to a subject, an ambiguously identified complaint that
did not provide a relevant time frame or to whom at [the Department] the complaint
was directed.” Moreover, the Department “was unable to locate the complaint on
which the requested disposition was premised. As such, the request did not identify
records in ‘definite, specific, and unequivocal terms.’ 98-ORD-17.” Accordingly, the
Department maintained “it was not reasonably possible to locate the records
requested.”

Under KRS 61.880(1), a public agency has five business days upon receipt of
a request in which to send a written response and either comply or deny the request
and explain why. See also KRS 197.025(7). Here, the Appellant’s request is dated
February 4, 2026, but the Department states it did not receive the request until
February 17, 2026. If so, the Department’s February 23, 2026, response was timely
under KRS 61.880 and KRS 197.025(7). The Office has consistently recognized that
it cannot resolve factual disputes between a requester and a public agency, including
disputes regarding when a person sent a request, when a public agency received a
request, and if or when a public agency sent a response. See, e.g., 23-ORD-220.
Accordingly, the Office cannot find that the Department violated the Act by failing to
send a written response within five business days of receiving the Appellant’s request
because the Office cannot resolve the related factual dispute between the parties
regarding when the Department received the Appellant’s request, when the
Department sent its response, and when the Appellant received that response.
However, the Department properly denied the request on appeal because it does not
“precisely describe” the records per KRS 61.872(3)(b).

When a person requests copies of public records under the Act, “[t]he public
agency shall mail copies of the public records to a person . . . after he or she precisely
describes the public records which are readily available within the public agency.”
KRS 61.872(3)(b). A description is precise “if it describes the records in definite,
specific, and unequivocal terms.” 13-ORD-077; 98-ORD-17 (internal quotation marks
omitted). A request fails to comply with KRS 61.872(3)(b) when it does not “describe
records by type, origin, . . . or any identifier other than relation to a subject.” 20-ORD-
017 (quoting 13-ORD-077). A request must be “specific enough so that a public agency
can identify and locate the records in question.” 19-ORD-132; 13-ORD-077 (quoting
OAG 89-8). Further, a request for any and all records “related to a broad and ill-
defined topic” generally fails to precisely describe records. 22-ORD-182; see also 21-
ORD-034 (finding a request for any and all records relating to “change of duties,”
“freedom of speech,” or “usage of signs” did not precisely describe the records); but see
Univ. of Ky. v. Kernel Press, Inc., 620 S.W.3d 43, 48 n.2 (Ky. 2021) (holding a request
was adequately precise when it sought “all records detailing [the] resignation” of a

specific employee). This degree of precision applies whether the request asks for hard
copies of the records or asks to receive the record(s) electronically, as the difficulties
associated with identifying and locating the responsive record(s) to ensure full
compliance are the same when the records are not searchable based on the criteria
provided. See 19-ORD-132; 18-ORD-068; 16-ORD-242; 14-ORD-073; 02-ORD-196. A
request that does not precisely describe the records “places an unreasonable burden
on the agency to produce often incalculable numbers of widely dispersed and ill-
defined public records.” 25-ORD-051; 99-ORD-14.

Here, the Department has explained initially and on appeal that it cannot
reasonably search for the record that Appellant seeks using the limited criteria that
he provides. In other words, the Department does not have an existing mechanism
by which to identify and locate the record without additional parameters to define the
search. Accordingly, the requested disposition cannot be properly characterized as
“readily available” within the Department. A public agency is required to make “all
reasonable efforts to locate records responsive to the requester’s application,” but a
requester is required “to describe the records he or she seeks so as to make locating
them reasonably possible.” City of Fort Thomas, 406 S.W.3d at 855. The Appellant
did not satisfy this requirement by asking for the disposition of his January 15
complaint regarding his “restrictive lockdown” at EKCC, rather than a specific
incident. Because the Department was unable to locate the subject complaint, 1 it
logically follows it could not reasonably locate the disposition of that complaint. For
this reason, the Department properly denied the Appellant’s request under
KRS 61.872(3)(b).

A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating an action in the
appropriate circuit court pursuant to KRS 61.880(5) and KRS 61.882 within 30 days
from the date of this decision. Pursuant to KRS 61.880(3), the Attorney General shall
be notified of any action in circuit court but shall not be named as a party in that
action or in any subsequent proceedings. The Attorney General will accept notice of
the complaint emailed to [email protected].

1 Once a public agency states affirmatively that it does not possess a record, the burden shifts to the
requester to make a prima facie showing that the record exists. Bowling v. Lexington–Fayette Urb.
Cnty. Gov’t, 172 S.W.3d 333, 341 (Ky. 2005). A requester must provide facts or evidence to make a
prima face showing that a record exists, i.e., the existence of a statute or regulation that requires the
creation of the record. See, e.g., 25-ORD-300; 21-ORD-177; 11-ORD-074.

Russell Coleman
Attorney General

/s/ Michelle D. Harrison
Michelle D. Harrison
Assistant Attorney General

James Harrison, #095435
Charles B. Bates, Staff Attorney III, JPSC
Nathan Goens, Assistant General Counsel, JPSC
Sara Talarigo, Paralegal, JPSC
Ann Smith, Executive Staff Advisor, JPSC