26-ORD-173 – Angela Hogan/Kentucky Board of Alcohol and Drug Counselor

Opinion Content:

April 21, 2026

In re: Angela Hogan/Kentucky Board of Alcohol and Drug Counselors

Summary: The Office cannot find that the Kentucky Board of Alcohol
and Drug Counselors (“the Board”) violated the Open Records Act (“the
Act”) because the Office is unable to resolve the related factual dispute
between the parties regarding when the Board sent its response.

Open Records Decision

On February 9, 2026, at 8:02 p.m., Angela Hogan (“the Appellant”) submitted
a request to the Board for “access to and copies of public records related to my
licensure, supervision role, and credentialing status with” the Board. On February
19, 2026, the Appellant initiated this appeal “regarding the response (or lack thereof)”
by the Board to her February 9 request.

However, the Appellant also claimed the Board responded on February 18,
2026, beyond the five business days allowed by KRS 61.880(1), but did not include a
copy of the Board’s response, as is required for the Office to review its merits. 1 See
KRS 61.880(2)(a); 40 KAR 1:030 § 1. Upon receipt of the notice of this appeal from
the Office, the Board provided the Office with a copy of its response letter dated
February 17, 2026, in which it advised the Appellant it had located records responsive
to her request and would send the unspecified records “via secured email to the email
address provided in your request.”

Upon receiving a request for public records under the Act, a public agency
“shall determine within five (5) [business] days . . . after the receipt of any such
request whether to comply with the request and shall notify in writing the person
making the request, within the five (5) day period, of its decision.” KRS 61.880(1).
Here, the Appellant states that she sent her request on February 9; however, the

1 For this reason, the Office’s review is confined to whether the Board sent a timely response upon
receipt of the Appellant’s request. On appeal, however, the Board clarifies it did not redact any
information from the records provided, nor did it withhold any responsive records.

documentation attached to her appeal confirms that she did not actually send the
request until after the close of business on that day; thus, it was not received or
deemed to have been received by the Board until the following business day. 2 Thus,
the Board’s response was not due until February 17, 2026.

The Board states it received the Appellant’s request on February 10, 2026, and
responded to it on February 17, 2026, i.e., the fifth business day following receipt of
the request. If so, the Board’s response was timely under KRS 61.880(1). As noted,
however, the Appellant alleges that the Board responded on February 18, 2026. The
Office has routinely found that it cannot resolve factual disputes between a requester
and a public agency, such as determining when a public agency received a request
and when the agency responded. See, e.g., 23-ORD-220 (the Office cannot resolve a
factual dispute as to whether a requester actually received a public agency’s
response); 26-ORD-049; 25-ORD-082; 23-ORD-062; 22-ORD-024; 21-ORD-233.
Accordingly, the Office cannot find the Board violated KRS 61.880(1) by failing to
respond timely upon receipt of the Appellant’s request because the Office cannot
resolve the factual dispute between the parties regarding whether the Board
responded on February 17 or February 18. 3

A party aggrieved by this decision may appeal it by initiating an action in the
appropriate circuit court pursuant to KRS 61.880(5) and KRS 61.882 within 30 days
from the date of this decision. Pursuant to KRS 61.880(3), the Attorney General shall
be notified of any action in circuit court but shall not be named as a party in that
action or in any subsequent proceedings. The Attorney General will accept notice of
the complaint emailed to [email protected].

Russell Coleman
Attorney General

/s/ Michelle D. Harrison
Michelle D. Harrison
Assistant Attorney General

2 Under KRS 446.030(a), “[i]n computing any period of time prescribed . . . by any applicable statute
or regulation, the day of the act, event or default after which the designated period of time begins to
run is not to be included.” See 24-ORD-046.
3 Upon receipt of the Board’s appeal response, including the responsive records, the Appellant raised
a number of questions and concerns regarding the Board’s “ongoing credentialing and supervision
record issues,” all of which are beyond the Office’s scope of review under KRS 61.880(2). “The Attorney
General is not empowered to . . . resolve non-open records related issues in an appeal initiated under
KRS 61.880(1).” 99-ORD-121; see also 25-ORD-003; 24-ORD-263; 19-ORD-188; 17-ORD-083; 15-ORD-
013.

Angela Hogan, Appellant
Catherine Falconer, General Counsel, Department of Professional Licensing
Jessica Hartley, Board Administrator, Board of Alcohol and Drug Counselors